Shame is the capacity to suffer under the gaze of the other. The other can be anyone, even oneself; we’re perfectly able to feel wounded by our own perceptions. There’s also a certain pride in shame—as proof of moral rectitude, of earnestness, or of competence. A patient learns that he will eventually go blind; it takes a year for him to confess this news to his family. He feels ashamed, and at the same time, he feels proud to suffer in silence. Shared emotion brings relief to the afflicted, yet it propagates his suffering; and by what right do I pass on my pain to my loved ones?

I think about this on a park bench, with a bottle of pineapple juice on one hand and no intention of calling my family. Not wanting to propagate my suffering is an excuse; if I die, my family’s pain will be far greater.

It’s the loser’s shame, then. If I pass out, I lose. Who am I if I can’t keep my blood sugar under control? You shouldn’t have eaten that bowl of ramen. It’s your responsibility. There’s this dog lying on a patch of grass in front of me, and he’s still yawning, and I desperately want to pet it. I want to tend to a garden. I haven’t been able to get out of the city yet; I’d love to go for a hike, to lose myself on some trail, to be part of a nature-driven epiphany that makes me understand how the world works and calms me down and makes me accepting of my illness, turns me into a placid, kind-eyed monk.

But I’m sitting on this bench and I can’t feel my legs, I’m sweating and panting and I can barely see. How am I supposed to play cool independent adventurer in the woods? I hear there are bears. I picture a bear yawning, and I hoist my two-liter bottle of juice to take another swig.

An illness is also a healing balm, an unguent—especially if it is socially accepted. It serves as fertile ground; it mothers your identity; it bears fruit and takes root. One benefits immensely from one’s illness; indeed, some are so eager to have one that they craft their own. They build slowly, with care. They decorate. They perform. To be ill is to be a victim, and that notion proves delightfully relaxing. Guilt is drawn out of you and replaced by a certain calmness that feels as protective as it feels alienating.

My diabetes is my greatest, most beloved excuse. It never fails. My diabetes removes me from the equation, cancels me out. My diabetes drops me inside a limbo, a liminal space. Why do I call it mine? It punishes and rewards me. It’s my biggest bet against shame; whenever the dreaded feeling bubbles up, I can use my glucose levels to run and hide, to defend myself, to set up a smokescreen.

It’s part of the intricate fabric of my body-mind, perhaps even of my soul. Yet there was a time, nebulous and distant, when I was not diabetic. I barely remember it. Was that truly me back then? Have I been two different people? I’d feel naked without my glucose monitor and my insulin pump. Every shift within my mind, every movement of my body, every lighting up of every neuron affects my illness, and my illness, in turn, influences every cell that thinks and feels. I cannot exist separately from my hypoglycemia.

Even worse so: will I ever be able to exist without shame? Shame precedes even my autoimmunity; shame has always been there. If everything’s interconnected, then I’m forced to admit that shame played a defining role in the development of my illness. It’s also playing a role in my losing consciousness; it gives and takes away.

I drink and stare at the dog. I think I’d like him to be the last thing I see. It’s a good final image. But then… what if I’m exaggerating? Maybe this is nothing and I’m making a complete fool of myself for believing I’m about to drop dead and miss out on all the beauty of life—oh, the tragedy!—and maybe this yawning dog is just a dog and not my last impression of the world and the epitome of tender simplicity.

Those who are ashamed are very good at being victims, but they will also try their best to be caregivers. Helping another wounded soul proves I’m not quite so miserable myself. Service to others is a weapon I can wield; to fight against the meaninglessness of my existence and to show I have a right to be here. My diabetes grants me the people’s pity, and unlocks a new perspective, that of the chronically ill: a vantage point to which the majority have no access. Illness touches us all, just as life does; yet autoimmunity and degenerative ailments, inevitable and relentless, are not, fortunately, a shared experience for our species. This means that there are certain things, certain feelings or ways of coping, that only us, the permanently sick, can understand. Cold comfort, I know. But to carry the bodily wisdom of a chronic ailment, to feel it, deeply and daily, carving and scarring, should also make me capable of great empathy, of great compassion.

It does not. I’d be a wonderful caregiver if I wasn’t wholly corrupted by the urge, the desperate desire to exist solely within the gaze of others. The image in their minds is more powerful than the present moment in which I live, and stronger than the reality I could build for myself. Shame is the guiding factor in all this; it turns real people into members of an audience, and one cannot fail in front of an audience. One cannot show oneself, one needs to win approval. To really care for someone includes, necessarily, that you be vulnerable and open, genuine and honest. If what I want is for others to perceive me as a caregiver, then I’ll never actually become one.

Once again, the problem lies in my inability to step outside myself.

Web image by Riley Revell 

Narrative

Isles

José Luis Marín Aznárez 05.11.26

Illness, emotion, story, and the interconnectedness of it all; a meditation on a park bench, on the verge of death

Zauner was 25 when her mother was diagnosed with an aggressive, late-stage, mid-life cancer. Zauner was a rebellious child, resentful of Umma’s version of tough love. Growing up the lone Asian student in her Oregon community, she felt both othered at school and an outsider among her mother’s Seoul relatives when she visited them each summer. Just as she was beginning to appreciate her Korean heritage and understand her mother’s love, she learned about Umma’s diagnosis.   

The first half of the memoir exuberantly brings to life scenes from Zauner’s childhood and her brief post-college years as a musician in New York City. Surprisingly, without hesitation, she paused her makeshift career and flew west to care intensively for her mother. Attempting to heroically save Umma, Zauner zealously learned to prepare the native foods they shared. “I would radiate joy and positivity,” Zauner pledged. “I would learn to cook for her—all the things she loved to eat, and I would single-handedly keep her from withering away” (69). Her optimistic culinary efforts produce a poetry of exacting descriptions of the flavors and textures and preparation of those foods. It’s grimly ironic that the chemotherapy her mother endured wiped out her ability to taste or digest Zauner’s loving offerings of health.  

The second half turns from living with Umma to living without her. Wishing to sustain her bond with her mother as Zauner grieved, she continued preparing her Korean family’s recipes. Walking down H Mart’s redolent aisles released “waves” of sorrow that mark the enduring ebb and flow of her grief. Unsuccessful with conventional therapy, she found cooking the best form of self-care: “Every dish I cooked exhumed a memory. Every scent and taste brought me back for a moment to an unravaged home. Knife-cut noodles in chicken broth took me back to lunch at Myeong Dong Gyoja . . . The kalguksu so dense from the rich beef stock and starchy noodles it was nearly gelatinous. My mother ordering more and more refills of their famously garlic-heavy kimchi” (212-213). An image of abundance in the midst of loss.

Zauner’s detailed descriptions of cooking and consuming invite readers to her table, reminding us—as previous celebrated writers have—of the power of the senses to evoke memory and the power of food to strengthen human bonds. Food also powers Zauner’s self-understanding and the unexpected transformational love for her mother: “The culture we shared was active, effervescent in my gut and in my genes, and I had to seize it, foster it so it did not die in me . . . If I could not be with my mother, I would be her” (223-224).  

Zauner’s writing is itself active and effervescent. Through her grief, she holds a steady, unflinching gaze on cancer and death. As she writes candidly about her family, Zauner is critically reflective about her own life. Her writerly achievement is the immediacy of her felt experiences, her grief and her joys made palpable. “Let me feel this,” she courageously writes, dismissing her Korean family’s admonitions to withhold tears (202). An unforgettable image of the process of loving transformation that Zauner experienced unfolds in her description of making the Korean staple kimchee. It is a slow, exacting process of fermenting cabbage that at first strikes her as “controlled death” because “[l]eft alone, a head of cabbage molds and decomposes. It becomes rotten, inedible. But when brined and stored, the course of its decay is altered. Sugars are broken down to produce lactic acid, which protects it from spoiling. Carbon dioxide is released and the brine acidifies. It ages. Its color and texture transmute. It exists in time and transforms. So it is not quite controlled death, because it enjoys a new life altogether” (223). 

As if miraculously, a few years after Umma died, Zauner’s itinerant music career took on a new life. The band she has fronted, Japanese Breakfast, recorded the album Psychopop with a song she wrote about her mother, “In Heaven.” Then they toured the U.S. and South Korea. Although her mother was skeptical about a musical career, Zauner imagined that Umma would be “glad that I had finally found a place where I belonged” (233). 

Crying in H Mart: A Memoir
Michelle Zauner

Publisher Alfred A Knopf
Place Published New York
Edition 2021
Page Count 239

Web photo by Portuguese Gravit

“I am we, we are a year, we year, we are rest, we rest.” 

In winter 2024, Sop had a severe relapse of myalgic encephalomyelitis, also called chronic fatigue syndrome (ME/CFS), leaving them housebound in South East London.

That summer, in the days leading up to a friend’s birthday celebration, the artist rested carefully so they would be able to attend. The night before, they started taking what was touted as a “magic” pill for insomnia. They didn’t sleep at all and had to miss the party. But in a sleep-deprived haze, they wrote, as they described in a recent interview [1], “a solidarity rant, a kind of letter to other disabled people stuck indoors.” 

When Shape Arts, a UK disability arts organization, approached Sop with a commission, they decided to adapt the essay into a script for We Year, a mixed-media love letter to others living with energy-limiting conditions. The short film premieres at RestFest—a film festival and virtual space by and for the disability community—as part of a program co-organized by The Remote Body, Resting Up Collective, and Ort Gallery. 

With a poetic voiceover and ethereal soundscape, We Year immerses viewers in a chronic illness flare during a sweltering summer, blending decades-old archival footage from when Sop was well enough to move outside freely with recent phone footage shot at home. Shifting between past and present and between interior and exterior, the experience is at once isolating and unifying, claustrophobic and liberating. 

We Year also features 16mm direct animation, a technique that involves drawing and scratching moving images directly onto film stock rather than recording with a camera. Here, Sop used ink to overlay the orange stress bars from their Garmin watch across the entire film—a constant representation of their body that acts as a symbolic barrier between them and the audience. 

The following interview has been edited for length and clarity. 

When did you begin to think of yourself as an artist? 

I always wanted to be an artist. Even as a kid, when I was asked, “What do you want to be?”, I was like, “An artist!” I honestly have never thought about doing anything else. I grew up in the deep countryside, and there wasn’t much access to contemporary culture, although I was obsessed with music and music magazines. There was this teen music magazine called Smash Hits that I loved, and I made collages and scrapbooks of pop stars. When I was 13, I went to a big retrospective of the massive British artist David Hockney, who just died, and it was the first time that I’d seen contemporary art. It blew my mind, and that’s the first time I remember thinking, “Oh, this is something serious that I want to do.” 

What questions or themes does your art usually explore? 

I find it hard to make work that isn’t about my life and the things that I’m dealing with. What I do always ends up being ultra-personal. That’s not something that a lot of people do, necessarily. The act of living as a chronically ill person means that you have to live in the world in a very different way from people who are not chronically ill. Chronic illness is a fertile area for ideas. You’re living the life and thinking about the life at the same time. If you’re an artist or someone who thinks about things in conceptual ways, you can’t help but try and interpret your life into art-making, projects, or ideas. Everything’s interesting. It’s like living life wonky.

As a chronically ill person,  I can’t do a 9 to 5. I can’t necessarily keep to plans, and I can’t always do basic things, like sometimes even look after myself in a normal  way. The agency that I have is to interrogate what this life means and the challenges that it poses and what is interesting about that. What can I say that’s beyond how I would perhaps describe being sick to a stranger? Like, what’s within that? All of the work that I make—even if it looks not about that—is going to be about that.   

And then the other part of it is that I grew up in the field and was a tomboy covered in mud. My understanding of the world was through nature, and now I’m in a flat without a garden. I can see some trees in the park just over there, but quite often, I’m not well enough to go and hang out in the park. I am pretty obsessed with nature and the fact that I can’t get to it. I can’t really have that life currently.  

In your bio, you describe yourself as “a torn and crooked leaf, a root embedded in the dirt, a shoot reaching to the sky.” Would you please elaborate on what this means? 

When I wrote that bio, I was making work about my body being the same as the microbiome in the soil. “A torn and crooked leaf” is being chronically ill. “A root embedded in the dirt” is really what it sounds like, within the context of that specific work. And the “shoot reaching to the sky”—my work deals with pretty hefty emotions, but there’s always hope. My life is not a miserable life; it is hopeful, and I do believe there’s something so crucial in being chronically ill that you absolutely have to keep hope alive. It takes a lot of work to do that and to get there. It’s not easy, but it’s super important. If you have this restricted life, you absolutely have to shoot for the sky. Because time just goes on.  

What does working in crip time [2] look like for you? What are your long-term goals as an artist? 

If you’re truly working in crip time, it’s fairly impossible to have long-term goals. You haven’t really got a choice when you work. You can do your very best to carve out time or space. Currently, I have about a couple of hours in the early morning when I can manage to do something. My afternoons and evenings—I simply can’t make work then. If you have such a limited time to make work, the amount of work you make is going to be low. It will have to meet your capacity, and that doesn’t fit well with current art market production timelines or expectations. Sometimes, you can’t make something for a year because the thing that you should be working on—and the thing that is your work—is your health. That’s your full-time job.  

I deeply believe that making in crip time actually is truthful to the world. We would probably all be better off if we did. Really, it means making work to your capacity, and that can mean a lot of things. You don’t need to be ill to make to your capacity. 

It’s a more authentic timeline of meeting yourself where you’re at, rather than forcing yourself to meet arbitrary or toxic timelines. 

You haven’t chosen to have chronic illness—you’re forced into doing that. And I don’t think that’s a bad thing necessarily. Asking what would I like to do for my long-term goals—I find it very hard to answer because, first of all, I live, like, day to day and, second, when I think about what my long-term goals would be, it’s from the perspective of someone without a disability because I currently cannot see how I would be able to do more than what I’m doing unless I had an enormous amount of more support. 

How did you decide which media to work with for this project? 

Films and writing have always been the two mediums I mostly turn to, and actually they’re the most accessible things for me to do now, being housebound. When I was asked to make the film, I just didn’t have it at all in my means to film new work or leave the house, so I had to kind of figure out how to make a new work out of what I had, which was this personal essay I wrote about being stuck inside in the summer. I made the film throughout another summer of being stuck inside. A lot of chronically ill people turn their camera or phone or whatever onto their surroundings, so I had bits and bobs that I filmed. When I started making films, I would just film tons of different stuff. I had my little Hi8 video camera around the whole time, so I had lots of little clips that I hadn’t used, and I didn’t actually think that I was ever going to use them for anything. But that obviously wasn’t enough, and I didn’t really want to make a film which was just a film inside my house—there’s plenty of films like that. I had a whole bunch of old footage from the 90s. I digitized all of these tapes a few years ago, and they looked so great. A lot of that stuff was filmed out of the house, and then there were funny effects that I filmed which made it into the films. There’s a lot of blobs of color, which are actually motorway lights and ended up being this really nice kind of texture, which floated over and broke up some of the images.  

Hi8 and MiniDVs are the two cameras I was using in the past, so I have footage from both of those. And then there was 16mm direct animation. Each section of the film has a different animation running over it, but the animation is quite transparent, so it’s always there. It’s textural and has multiple meanings. And then I commissioned my friend to make the soundtrack. 

Would you elaborate on the meaning of the title of the film? 

The thing that’s turned me on most about this film is the fact that I can try and get “to year” and “yearing” adopted as a new way of describing spending all this time being sick. I think the word “year” is long enough for people to imagine, “Whoa, you are sick for a whole year. That’s a really long, unbearable time.” But then you make it into “yearing,” and then it could be even less than a year, but it’s probably closer to a year or multiple years. Then I was interested in what would happen if the years were then broken up with periods of being well, with relapses included as well.  

I find it really tiresome to have to explain the last five years of my life. So to not have to say, “Well, I was sick for a couple of years, housebound and bedbound, and then I got well again, and then I had a relapse”—it’s just like, “I was yearing.” I would love for it to become part of the lexicon of chronic illness.  

What does it mean to have “We Year” screened at RestFest? 

There’s this informal network of crip friends who work with each other. Not everyone works together, but we all know each other and there’s really close friendships within this group. They’re all small, crip-led organizations that have been made pretty much for the same purpose, which is remote events, screenings, and workshops. I was just really keen to connect and uplift all of these organizations. We created this program together, and I’m really proud of it. It’s been a lot of work, but it’s really nice making things with your friends. The access intimacy side of it all is real. Creating or programming with your friends is a very accessible way of making because we all understand each other and our capacities. I’ve said capacities a million times. 

You need to coin a new term for that as well. 

Okay, I’ll get on that for next time. 

We Year, through July 12 (if you start watching on June 28); RestFest Film Festival. “I am we, we are a year, we year, we are rest, we rest.” 

[1] “Interview with artist-filmmaker Sop + a Special Screening of their New Film.” RestFest, 2026,
https://restfest.substack.com/p/interview-with-artist-filmmaker-sop. 
[2] In her 2013 book Feminist, Queer, Crip, disability scholar Alison Kafer writes, “Rather than bend disabled bodies and minds to meet the clock, crip time bends the clock to meet disabled bodies and minds.” 

Tooker depicted waiting for a more specifically governmental bureaucracy in his painting, “The Government Bureau.” In that painting, the waiting people are reproduced several times to emphasize their anonymity, and the multiple bureaucrats peer out from frosted windows with only their eyes and noses visible — bringing to mind the concept of the “medical gaze” promulgated by the French philosopher,  Michel Foucault.

In another Tooker painting, “Ward,” he renders patients’ anonymity and a sense of abandonment in the hospital setting–with government bureaucracy invoked by the American flags hanging on the wall.

Image Credit
The Waiting Room, George Tooker, 1959. Collection of the Smithsonian American Art Museum. Image used for educational and critical commentary purposes.

George Tooker documentary videos from Columbus Museum

Realizing he was a member of a tangled (a favorite word of the author) group of transsexuals, James felt himself trapped in a conundrum of gender (he felt and considered himself female) versus sex (he was genotypically and phenotypically male). “To me gender is not physical at all but is altogether insubstantial; it is soul, perhaps, it is talent it is the essentialness of oneself” (p.25).  

After some fruitless interactions with the medical profession, Morris travels to Casablanca in the summer of 1972 to undergo sex-changing surgery and becomes Jan Morris. Unlike many if not most transsexuals, post-operatively Morris fared quite well emotionally and was quite happy with the change.  

Jan Morris’s writing is as humorous and eloquent as James Morris’s was. She describes how magazines like Rolling Stone, publishers like Random House, and thousands of readers have never cared what gender or sex was holding the pen; how life changed in clubs, restaurants, and in taxicabs, where Jan met the first man to kiss her, post surgery, “in a carnal way” (p.151). Morris records that “all I did was blush.” 

As the chronicle of one sensitive and highly literate man’s journey from manhood to womanhood, Conundrum offers much commentary on the states of mind of a transsexual, a highly polished writer undergoing the humoral, mental, emotional, and cultural changes of such surgery.  

Prior to surgery, Morris writes about feeling deprived of an identity: “I realize now that the chief cause of my disquiet was the fact that I had none. I was not to others what I was to myself. I did not conform to the dictionary’s definition–‘itself and not something else’ ” (p.40-41). All Morris wanted “was liberation, or reconciliation–to live as myself, to clothe myself in a more proper body, and achieve Identity at last” (p.104). It took courage but it was worth it and Conundrum reads like nothing more, and nothing less, than a successful odyssey of the sexual soul. 

Jan Morris died in 2020, aged 94. 

Jan Morris: Journalist, Historian, ‘Writer About Place’ – Faculty of English

Conundrum
Jan Morris 
New York Review of Books Classics, paperback 2006: 176 pages 
Originally published by Faber and Faber, London, 1974 

Web image by medhum

Based on the novel of the same name by André Aciman, this multilingual film took the world by storm, using three languages (French, Italian, and English) in the first five minutes. The resulting language barriers add to feelings of yearning established by the musical score, whose key elements originate from Sufjan Stevens (Futile Devices; Mystery of Love; Visions of Gideon). Music, language, and literature carry the work’s primary themes, namely those of precocity and sexuality. Elio embodies all three—his main hobbies include transcribing music, playing the piano, and reading. These themes are further captured by the symbol of the apricot, its relationship to precocity and sexuality explicitly discussed in the film. Furthermore, the denouement of the film, arrives through a figuratively rich and overtly sensual scene involving Elio and the summer stand-in of the apricot, the peach, (1:34:30-1:40:24), beautifully capturing the relationship between Elio’s intellectual maturity and emotional naïveté.

Controversy surrounds Call Me by Your Name, primarily regarding consent and age statutes. Although Elio is over the 1983 age of consent in Italy and most United States jurisdictions, his relationship with Oliver evokes discomfort. This speaks to the historical Western perception of gay relationships as predatory. Nonetheless, their relationship warrants some skepticism, particularly regarding age-based power dynamics. The Perlmans support and watch over their son as the relationship progresses, frequently checking in and pointing him to literary passages as points of reference. In this way, the film navigates a complicated and loaded social topic, particularly in the queer community.

Further depth is added by considering the historical context of the early 1980s. By 1983, the AIDS epidemic had globally taken hold, the virus only identified in France the May prior to the events of the film. “Gay cancer” was a widely used term for a rare and defining symptom of AIDS, singling out the Western community hardest hit at that time. The merciless, viral specter of death overshadowed the gay liberation movement of the previous decade. HIV is never mentioned in the film, but its presence must be known by Oliver, adding to his own hesitations and fears about his and Elio’s sexualities. 1983 was also rife with relevant political fallout: Gerry Studds––the first openly gay member of Congress––became embroiled in a scandal involving a relationship with a 17-year-old, and Bettino Craxi was elected as Italian Prime Minister, eventually leading to the collapse of the modern Italian political machine. Craxi plays a central role in the peripheral events of the film, his influence appearing on television and in conversations with dinner guests.

Call Me by Your Name is an evocative masterpiece, one of the few movies that I can watch repeatedly (cf. Heated Rivalry). Despite my inherent preference for novels, this film, far and away, manifests a beauty missing from its literary inspiration. The actors perform splendidly, the music deepens the emotional journey, and the cinematography transports the audience perfectly to the setting. Every time I watch it, I discover greater depth and fall in love with it more, even if I can never look at a peach the same way.

Call Me by Your Name 
Director: Luca Guadagnino 
Screenplay: James Ivory 
Awards: Best Adapted Screenplay (Critics’ Choice Awards); Best Male Lead [Chalamet] & Best Cinematography (Independent Spirit Awards); Outstanding Film-Wide Release (GLAAD Media Awards); Best Editing (Nastro d’Argento Awards & Golden Ciak Awards); Breakout Actor [Chalamet] (Gotham Independent Film Awards & Hollywood Film Awards)
Year 2017 
Studio Sony Pictures Classics 
Running Time (in minutes) 132 
Based on Call Me by Your Name by André Aciman 

Web image from Sony Pictures.

At age 18, Frida Kahlo suffered a catastrophic accident that had lifelong consequences. The school bus in which she was a passenger collided with a trolley. Her spinal column was broken in three places, as were her collarbone, two ribs, her right leg and foot. The treatment was to lie on her back for one month, enclosed in a plaster cast. In addition, Kahlo had polio as a child, and one leg was shorter and thinner than the other.

This stunning portrait demands the viewer’s attention. A woman, Frida Kahlo, looms in the foreground, central to the painting, facing the viewer fully frontal, a few tears spilling down her face. She is nude, except for a sheet that is wrapped around her foreshortened lower body, and the widely spaced straps of an upper-body corset. On the one hand, the figure is passive, gazing at us almost without expression, completely still, acceptant of the scattered nails and rigid column that penetrate her body. On the other hand, the beauty of her perfectly formed breasts and well-formed upper body, the eyes that engage the viewer, subtly convey the energy of the figure’s spirit and will. At this point in Kahlo’s life, the painful physical problems that had plagued her on and off for years were becoming unrelenting. Doctors prescribed a variety of orthopedic corsets to support her degenerating spine. The portrait seems to personify pain and simultaneously some level of tolerance for pain.

Many who view the painting are reminded of images of Christ on the cross. Kahlo was certainly long-suffering and represented the physical and emotional aspects of her condition in many of her works (for example, “Tree of Hope” and “Henry Ford Hospital“), but the energy and originality of her personality and artistic vision shine through. For interesting commentary on “The Broken Column,” see Hayden Herrera. Frida Kahlo: The Paintings (New York: Harper Perennial) 2002, pp. 180-183. Also useful is Gannit Ankori’s commentary in her book, Imaging Her Selves: Frida Kahlo’s Poetics of Identity and Fragmentation (Westport, Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press, 2002, pp. 114-119). Ankori points out that the vertical fissure of Kahlo’s body and the fissures in the earth surrounding her evoke violation — consistent with Kahlo’s statement that a metal rod had entered her hip and penetrated her vagina.

Web image from Wiki Commons

Although Stevenson’s fieldwork was unusually thorough, mainstream scientists rejected reincarnation as a viable explanation and instead focused on potential methodological weaknesses such as retrospective testimony, cultural influence, and the difficulty of ruling out information leakage. Stevenson described the cases as “suggestive,” but he made clear that reincarnation—or at least the survival and transfer of some aspect of personality—was, in his view, the most plausible interpretation.

The twenty cases in the 1966 volume represented only a fraction of the material Stevenson had been collecting since 1960. His early publications had attracted the attention of Chester Carlson, the inventor of the Xerox process, who left a bequest of one million dollars to the University of Virginia upon his death in 1968. The Department of Psychiatry used the gift to establish the Division of Perceptual Studies (DOPS), with Stevenson as its founding director. The name provided an academically respectable umbrella for research that included, but did not explicitly advertise, the study of children’s past-life memories.

Over the next three and a half decades, Stevenson and his colleagues expanded their investigations across Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and the Americas. By the time of his death in 2007, Stevenson had published twelve additional books and more than three hundred papers, documenting over 2,000 cases. In 1999, journalist Tom Shroder’s detailed investigation, Old Souls. The Scientific Evidence for Past Lives offered an intimate portrait of Stevenson’s fieldwork and helped bring the research to wider public attention.²

Leadership of the program passed to child psychiatrist Jim Tucker in 2002, when Stevenson retired.³ Tucker became Director of DOPS in 2014 and, in 2021, published Before, an updated synthesis of his own two earlier books. ⁴ Tucker reports that the DOPS database now includes more than 2,500 cases worldwide, including many from North America. Only a minority—roughly 15–25 percent—qualify as “strong cases,” meaning that the child’s statements were independently verified as matching a specific deceased individual.

The strongest cases share several converging features: verified statements about the previous life, verified identification of the deceased individual, physical correspondences such as birthmarks or birth defects, behavioral continuities, and early onset of statements. One of Stevenson’s most striking findings involved physical correspondences. By 1997, he had documented 210 cases in which a child had a birthmark or birth defect corresponding to a wound on the deceased individual, and in 49 of these, he obtained autopsy reports confirming the precise wound locations.⁵ These findings were presented in detail in Where Reincarnation and Biology Intersect and in his massive two-volume monograph Reincarnation and Biology.⁶

Here is an example of one of Ian Stevenson’s earlier strong cases. When Swarnlata Mishra was three years old, she began singing unfamiliar songs and performing dance steps her family had never seen, dances from a region of India more than a hundred miles from the family’s home. Soon she was describing a former life as a woman named Biya Pathak, recalling the layout of Biya’s house, the names of her children, and even a stash of money hidden in a wall. Stevenson documented her statements before any contact with the Pathak family, and when they eventually visited, Swarnlata greeted them with an ease and specificity that startled everyone present. She correctly identified family members, teased one man with a childhood nickname only Biya had used, and pointed out a brother’s limp. The encounter had the uncanny feel of a reunion rather than an interview, and for Stevenson it became one of the clearest examples of a case where detailed memories, personality traits, and verifiable facts converged before any possibility of normal information transfer.

More than half a century later, Jim Tucker encountered a very similar pattern in the case of “Ryan,” a young boy from the American Midwest. At age four, Ryan began speaking urgently about a previous life in Hollywood—describing movie sets, agents, and a bustling life in Los Angeles. His parents, who had no interest in reincarnation, tried to reassure him, but the boy’s distress grew until Tucker became involved. Using Ryan’s spontaneous statements, Tucker and the family identified a long-forgotten bit-part actor and Hollywood extra from the 1930s and 40s. Ryan had given more than fifty details about this man’s life, including the street he lived on, the name of a restaurant he frequented, and the fact that he had danced on Broadway before moving west. Many of these details were later verified in archives and autobiographical sources unavailable to the family. What made the case especially compelling to Tucker was not only the accuracy of the statements but the emotional tone: Ryan spoke of the former life with longing and confusion, as if caught between two identities, until the memories gradually faded around age six.

Here is an example of a case in which the child had birthmarks corresponding to the deceased person’s wounds. In rural Burma, a young boy began speaking at age three about having been a man who was shot from behind while walking along a road. His parents were startled not only by the specificity of his statements but by his two unusual birthmarks: a small, round mark on his chest and a larger, irregular one on his back. When Stevenson later investigated, he found that the boy’s descriptions matched the death of a man from a nearby village who had been killed by a close-range gunshot. Eyewitness accounts and medical documentation confirmed the wound pattern, which corresponded closely to the boy’s birthmarks. The child also showed a deep, visceral fear of guns and loud noises, reacting with panic in ways that seemed disproportionate to anything in his current environment. The case combined early and detailed verbal statements, independently verifiable information about a violent death, and physical marks on the child’s body that mirrored the trauma he described.

Stevenson’s long-term research program—and Tucker’s continuation of it—poses a direct challenge to the assumption that consciousness is wholly generated by the brain. Across more than 2,500 investigated cases, they documented young children who spontaneously described memories, behaviors, and emotional dispositions corresponding to identifiable deceased individuals. While most cases are incomplete or ambiguous, a substantial minority meet stringent evidential criteria, and more than two hundred combine multiple independent lines of evidence: verified statements, behavioral continuities, and physical correspondences. Critics have proposed cultural contamination, suggestion, fraud, or loose investigative methods, but none of these explanations plausibly account for the best-documented cases, especially those with medical records, multiple independent witnesses, and physical anomalies. Even the most skeptical reviewers have struggled to articulate a coherent alternative hypothesis that explains the full pattern of data.⁷

For more than sixty years, however, mainstream scientists have dismissed the research. Critics argue that the stories of past lives are most likely due to coincidence, misinterpretation, parental influence, observer bias, or other sources of error. They emphasize the complexities of contextualizing and translating these “memories,” especially in cultures with strong beliefs in reincarnation.⁷ Yet critics rarely engage with the case narratives themselves; instead, they rely on hypothetical sources of error. To attribute all of these cases solely to flawed methodology would require assuming that Stevenson, Tucker, and DOPS have repeatedly committed the same errors for six decades despite their detailed rebuttals of such claims.

The deeper criticism, however, is philosophical. Although surveys show that most Americans and physicians believe in a soul or spirit, most philosophers and neuroscientists endorse a materialist-reductionist view: the brain creates the mind through electrochemical activity, and consciousness ends with the death of the body. Clinically, there is ample evidence that consciousness depends on a functioning brain—brain injuries and diseases clearly alter mental states, and imaging techniques reveal neural pathways associated with various emotions and thoughts. For clinical purposes, consciousness appears entirely dependent on the physical brain.

Yet this dependence does not settle the metaphysical question of what consciousness is. Critics of Stevenson and Tucker often assume, without argument, that the physical world as described by contemporary physics is the totality of what exists, and that consciousness must therefore be a byproduct of physical interactions. But subjective experience—the interior world of personal identity—does not obviously follow from any known property of quarks, electrons, photons, neutrinos, or the forces that govern them. The gap between third-person description and first-person experience is conceptually radical. No arrangement of particles, however complex, seems to entail subjectivity, i.e. interior life, in the way that arrangements of particles entail objects, organisms, or chemical bonding. To assume that this gap will close through further study of neural circuitry is to smuggle in a metaphysical conclusion under the guise of scientific optimism.

The quantum world is exceptionally weird – in many ways it violates common sense. Particles are also waves and waves are particles. An electron can be in multiple places at once. The behavior of one particle may determine the behavior of another, even though they are too far apart for a message to pass between them. Particles can tunnel through barriers apparently without having enough energy to do so. However, none of this weirdness suggests that large accumulations of particles (e.g. atoms, molecules, brains) could generate an interior world of personal identity There must be a deeper, more complete, theory of what exists in the universe that does account for the generation of consciousness; a quantum of subjectivity, if you will. As science writer Jim Holt summarized in Why Does the World Exist?, “The properties of a complex system like the brain don’t just pop into existence from nowhere; they must derive from the properties of the system’s ultimate constituents. Those ultimate constituents must therefore have subjective features themselves.”⁸

This is why the possibility that consciousness has a fundamental place in the universe is not mystical speculation but a legitimate philosophical alternative. Some philosophers and neuroscientists propose that consciousness may be an intrinsic aspect of matter, or that the universe contains a fundamental “interior” dimension alongside its measurable exterior. Panpsychism—the view that consciousness is woven into the structure of matter—is endorsed by a small, but growing, minority of philosophers, including David Chalmers⁹, Philip Goff¹⁰, and Galen Strawson.¹¹ Another group, notably Thomas Nagel¹² and John Searle¹³, acknowledge that our current physical ontology is incomplete, although not fully endorsing panpsychism. Physics has repeatedly revised its understanding of matter; it is not unreasonable to suspect that consciousness may require a similarly deep revision. To quote Thomas Nagel, “Consciousness is the most conspicuous obstacle to a comprehensive naturalism that relies only on the resources of physical science. The existence of consciousness seems to imply that the physical description of the universe, despite its richness and explanatory power, is only part of the truth.”¹²

Given these considerations, the continuation of consciousness, at least in some form, after death seems at least a possibility. Stevenson and Tucker’s work may well represent the identification of a previously unknown natural phenomenon, perhaps analogous to reported near-death experiences — well-documented yet difficult to explain. To my mind, this conclusion is more likely than is six decades of repeated errors.

However, that doesn’t mean the “former lives” data necessarily support a traditional doctrine of reincarnation, in which a unitary soul passes from one body to another. If a psychic dimension of the cosmos exists, a one-to-one transmission of “mind-stuff” to a newborn baby in the same country and culture seems overly simplistic, more in line with supernatural beliefs than with an unknown natural phenomenon. It is notable that the phenomenon is rare and the memories transient and strongly associated with traumatic death. Could it be that, under certain conditions, a “package” of psychic impressions may transfer from a dying person to a newborn, occasionally even influencing the child’s body? This, like any other scenario, is speculative, given our ignorance of the origin and meaning of consciousness in the physical world.

The broader point is that most philosophers and neuroscientists begin with an unexamined premise: that everything real must be physical in the sense described by current physics. But consciousness—the one phenomenon we know from the inside—does not obviously fit within that framework. Before declaring that mind must be reducible to matter, we should ensure that our conception of matter is adequate to account for mind at all. Consequently, Stevenson’s and Tucker’s six-decade quest to understand the experience of children who report having lived former lives should, if anything, leave us wondering whether we really know what we think we know about the way the universe works.

References 

1. Stevenson, Ian Twenty Cases Suggestive of Reincarnation, University of Virginia Press, 1980 [First published in 1966] 
2. Schroder, Tom. Old Souls. The Scientific Evidence for Past Lives. New York, Simon & Schuster, 1999 
3. Tucker, Jim B. Ian Stevenson and Cases of the Reincarnation Type, Journal of Scientific Exploration. 2008; 22: 36-43 
4. Tucker, Jim. B. Before: Children’s Memories of Previous Lives, St. Martin’s Press, 2021 
5. Stevenson, Ian. Where Reincarnation and Biology Intersect. Westport. Praeger, 1997 
6. Stevenson, Ian. Reincarnation and Biology: A Contribution to the Etiology of Birthmarks and Birth Defects, Westport, Praeger, 1997 [Two volumes] 
7. Matlock, J. G. ‘Reincarnation Case Studies: Criticisms’. Psi Encyclopedia. London: The Society for Psychical Research. <https://psi-encyclopedia.spr.ac.uk/articles/criticisms-reincarnation-case-studies/>. (2022, retrieved 24 March 2026) 
8. Holt, Jim. Why Does the World Exist? London, W. W. Norton & Company, 2012, p. 194 
9. Chalmers, David J. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford University Press, 1997 
10. Goff, Philip. Galileo’s Error. Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness. New York, Pantheon Books, 2019 
11. Strawson, Galen. Consciousness and Its Place in Nature, Imprint Academic, 2024 
12. Nagel, Thomas. Mind & Cosmos. New York, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 35 
13. Searle, John. Mind: A Brief Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2005 

Web image by Medhum.org

Attending plays is not always just a passive experience. Through various means playwrights, producers, composers, choreographers, set designers, and others have available to them, they can make plays immersive and interactive for audiences. A good example, among many, is Florian Zeller’s play, The Father. 

The Father is the story of an older man with Alzheimer’s disease (André) and his progression through first living on his own, then living with his daughter (Anne), and finally living in a nursing home. Or, is it? It’s hard to tell, and that is the intention of the playwright, Florian Zeller, who in a 2021 interview with Forbes Magazine,* said his aim was, 

to tell the story from the inside and put the audience in a unique position as though they were going through a labyrinth—questioning everything they’re seeing. It also was a way for me to play with the idea of disorientation because I not only wanted The Father to be a story but also an experience. The experience being what it’s like to lose everything, including your own bearings as a viewer and to be uncertain of what is and isn’t real. It was a way for the audience to experience a slice of dementia.

The director, Doug Hughes, creates the audience experience through an interplay among set designs, lighting effects, repeated scene sequences, and time loops as circumstances for various behaviors like memory loss, paranoia, anger, and lasciviousness. All the scenes take place in one room that serves at different times as André’s flat, Anne’s flat, and André’s nursing home room. The furnishings of the room change based on the supposed setting, but the walls are exactly the same for all of them. In different scenes, André is not always sure where he is, and neither is the audience.  

Early in the play, André hears Anne tell him she’s relocating from Paris to London with her lover, but she is present to him in most of the scenes thereafter and until the end of the play when he’s told by a nurse that Anne had moved to London some time ago. Had she really left Paris and was never actually there in all those other scenes? He wonders and so does the audience. In other scenes, the way characters from the past and present enter and exit distorts time for André, and so while audience members know the linear trajectory of the disease course, they can’t be sure of where they are in that course during a given scene. With the last scene taking place in André’s nursing home room with the same walls seen in his flat and Anne’s flat, the audience can’t be faulted for wondering whether all that came before was just one of André’s hallucinations. 

The Disorienting Is Clarifying

If the play had been staged as the customary audience view of outside looking in, the audience would have merely witnessed the familiar manifestations of Alzheimer’s disease and a familiar progression of events. This view would have afforded a new appreciation for the trauma it causes to those who are not closely acquainted with the symptoms of Alzheimer’s, while those who are familiar with them could possibly achieve a measure of catharsis. Zeller endeavors to do much more by offering a view of Alzheimer’s from the inside looking out and a means to grasp the actual experience of it. He is successful when audience members find themselves working as hard as André is to discern fact from fiction, past from present, and here from there.   

This can be no easy feat for the stage, and no wonder then that the Broadway production team enlisted an “illusion consultant” (Jim Steinmeyer) and a medical advisor (Dr. Randi Diamond). The intimate experiences the actor playing André (Frank Langella) and the director (Doug Hughes) have had with Alzheimer’s disease through family members no doubt contributed to the production’s authenticity as well.  

Zeller doesn’t leave the audience members defenseless in their efforts to orient themselves. He associates André’s grasp of his own situation with the whereabouts of his watch: “I need to know exactly where I am during the day. I’ve always had this watch, you know. If I were to lose it, I’d never recover.” As André’s dementia progresses and his powers of perception weaken, we see fewer objects in Anne’s flat. In the end, Zeller is hoping that confusing and disorienting the audience members will clarify the dementia experience for them.

Notes:
*Dawson A. Florian Zeller takes viewers into the labyrinth of dementia with The Father. Forbes. March 30, 2021.
This essay is based on a live performance of The Father presented by the Manhattan Theater Club at the Samuel J. Friedman Theater in New York City that ran between April and June of 2016. 
Translated from French by Christopher Hampton.
Brain photo:  Processing language, left brain hemisphere (sagittal view). Stephanie Forkel, NatBrainLab. Source: Wellcome Collection
License: Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)
Watch photo from Wikicommons images and licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license.

In Sophocles’s Oedipus Rex, a plague ravages Thebes as divine punishment for an unpunished crime—the murder of the eponymous king’s predecessor.

Two and a half millennia later, illness remains a metaphor in Robert Icke’s buzzy retelling of the Freud-genic tragedy, now on Broadway after a West End run last fall. Susan Sontag, who cautioned that portraying disease as a symbol of social decay can stigmatize patients, would likely disapprove. (Perhaps, apotheosized on Mount Olympus, she cursed Lesley Manville, who plays Oedipus’s wife and—spoiler alert—mother Jocasta, with an illness; Denise Cormier filled in when I saw the production.)

At curtain rise, on a stage-wide video screen, Oedipus (a charismatic and commanding Mark Strong)—reimagined as a politician on the cusp of electoral victory—tells a throng of eager reporters and supporters: “The civic body is ill. And that isn’t… chemicals in lakes—it’s us; we’re sick… The water got poisoned, and we got used to the taste.”

Economic inequality and xenophobia abound, as do rumors surrounding the death of Laius, the former ruler and Jocasta’s former husband. And so Oedipus promises to open an investigation. This off-script announcement exasperates his campaign manager and brother-in-law Creon (John Carroll Lynch), but Oedipus is steadfast in determining what happened. In Icke’s adaptation, probing the metaphorical plague is less a divine mandate and more a political act of narrative control. And, as Oedipus doubles down on transparency, what he uncovers about a fateful crossroads unravels his sense of self.

The truth of Oedipus’s identity is old news for most viewers, and we know that he is going to win. Yet Hildegard Bechtler’s set—an office with a hodgepodge of furniture, TV screens, and a clock counting down until the release of the election results—cultivates a palpable sense of uncertainty.

The successful set embodies Mikhail Bakhtin’s notion of the chronotope, or the inextricable fusion of time and space in literature. The literary theorist cites the road as one example of a chronotope. Social divisions such as class, nationality, and religion collapse, and time unfolds unpredictably through chance encounters rather than routine.

In Oedipus, as election night comes to a close, movers strip the campaign headquarters bare, transforming the space into a chronotope that mirrors how our hero is stripped of everything he once believed about himself. The ticking clock heightens the temporal pressure, heralding the landslide victory while portending the inexorable revelation that Oedipus did what every little boy dreams: killed Dad and married Mom.

Bakhtin also argues that chronotopes allow abstract ideas about philosophy, society, and cause and effect—say, the limits of free will and the illusion of power—to “take on flesh and blood.” Oedipus highlights the vital role chronotopes play in narratives, even if the coda transports us to the start of the campaign, undoing everything.

And even if much of the script doesn’t sparkle. For instance, Jocasta telling Oedipus “You’ll be the death of me” and calling him “baby boy” feels heavy-handed. Modern updates to Oedipus’s family dynamic have mixed success. The parts of adoptive mother Merope (Anne Reid) and daughter Antigone (Olivia Reis) are a welcome addition and expansion, respectively, bringing understated humor and wisdom. On the other hand, Icke casts one of Oedipus’s sons, Polyneices (James Wilbraham), as gay and the other, Eteocles (Jordan Scowen), as unfaithful. This framing raises an uneasy question: Are we meant to read queerness as a moral transgression on par with infidelity or incest? (Sontag, who was bisexual, probably wouldn’t be thrilled by this either.)

Icke’s greatest writing, however, is Jocasta’s hesitatingly revealed, harrowing backstory: She was only 13 when Laius raped her and forced her to abandon the resulting child. Jocasta recalls the delivery in visceral detail: the fluorescent lights of the hospital, the newborn Oedipus’s mucus-slick body. But she is denied the opportunity to share her traumatic account on her own terms; in his relentless quest for answers, Oedipus forces her long-hidden narrative, precipitating the discovery of their true relationship.

Narrative medicine emphasizes that this kind of listening can be destructive to both patient and listener. Indeed, Jocasta kills herself, and Oedipus gouges out his eyes with her heels. (Not very healing.)

Some narrative humility would have served Oedipus well. As Sayantani DasGupta writes, “narrative humility acknowledges that our patients’ stories are not objects that we can comprehend or master, but rather dynamic entities that we can approach and engage with, while simultaneously… engaging in constant self-evaluation and self-critique about issues such as our own role in the story.” With greater narrative humility, Oedipus might have better seen Jocasta—and himself.

Icke’s Oedipus teaches us that listening must be humble, ethical, and emotionally attuned; had it been so, perhaps the drama’s seemingly inevitable ending could have been averted.

Oedipus, through Feb. 8 at Studio 54 in New York; oedipustheplay.com.

Bakhtin, Mikhail. “Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel: Notes toward a Historical Poetics.” The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M.M. Bakhtin, edited by Michael Holquist, translated by Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, University of Texas Press, 1981, pp. 84-258.

DasGupta, Sayantani. “Narrative Humility.” The Lancet, vol. 371, no. 9617, 2008, pp. 980-981. thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736%2808%2960440-7/fulltext

Web image from Sonia Friedman Productions Limited.