Jurecic’s astutely researched, nuanced answers to those questions propose a corrective to the extreme skepticism of “disembodied criticism.” Such criticism, she claims, dismisses testimonial writing from “a position of distance and privilege.”  At the same time, her answers affirm that intellectually “rigorous” responses to texts are central to the critical humanities (15). To support her position, she offers attentive readings of illness narratives by Virginia Woolf, Reynolds Price, and Jean-Dominique Bauby, as well as the theoretical writing of literary and other scholars.  For instance, Jurecic speculates that the condition of a reader’s body aligns with their responses to texts. In a chapter called “Theory’s Aging Body,” she observes that as skeptical scholarly readers aged—think of Stephen Greenblatt, Michel Foucault, Judith Butler—they turned their attention to “illness, vulnerability, and mortality” (93).  Jurecic also suggests that criticism’s function to expose cultural conditions turns illness stories into critiques of the effects of contemporary medicine on our experiences of vulnerability and mortality. The relatively new concept of living “at risk” is a case in point. Stories about living with the risk of experiencing a particular illness in the future leave potential patients with uncertainty,” prompting narratives that seek the “personal meaning of the impersonal statistics” that medical encounters now regularly deliver (18).   

Jurecic also reflects on the ways theorists have understood the possibilities of representing and responding to pain in the varied approaches of philosophical thinkers Elaine Scarry, Martha Nussbaum, and Richard Rorty, along with anthropologists Jean E. Jackson, Byron Good, and Veena Das. In an exceptionally comprehensive and nuanced reading of Susan Sontag’s theoretical, fictional, and journal writing about suffering, Jurecic uncovers Sontag’s inconsistent, yet revelatory positions on the human capacity for responding to representations of pain. The chapter on Sontag is enriched by Jurecic’s reading of Annie Lebovitz’s controversial photographs of Sontag’s final days (included in A Photographer’s Life: 1990-2005) and David Reiff’s responses to Sontag’s suffering in his memoir about his mother’s illnesses (Swimming in a Sea of Death).   

Illness as Narrative closes with examples of what Jurecic calls reparative writing and reading practices. Reparative writers, such as Jean-Dominique Bauby (The Diving Bell and the Butterfly), Jurecic claims, both create “a more coherent sense of themselves” and dislodge culturally “fixed ideas and narratives” about illness or disability (109). Her discussion of reparative reading considers the limits of two competing readings of Anne Fadiman’s The Spirit Catches You and You Fall Down. One assumes that readers will empathically and unreflectively imagine those who are culturally different from themselves. The other looks skeptically at the assumption that what medical educators call cultural competence can be acquired by reading a book. Jurecic suggests that strategies for reading and teaching informed by Janelle S. Taylor, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, and Rita Felski encourage more complex habits of response, such as Taylor’s concept of “’empathic curiosity’” (122).    

Illness as Narrative poses questions so central to discussions in the medical humanities that it should be read by those who teach in the health professions and disciplines. Jurecic’s book advances the groundbreaking case made by Arthur Frank that illness narratives contribute not only to medicine, but also to contemporary culture and individual lives. Since Illness as Narrative rigorously addresses questions of how to respond to and teach the literature of suffering, it has consequential implications for literary studies and the critical humanities more generally. It exemplifies how a marginalized sub-field can offer a perspective that the dominant theories in the larger discipline fail to notice. Perhaps the most urgent professional question Jurecic asks is what we lose if writers and readers attuned to the ill or suffering body are not heard in critical discussions. Fortunately, Jurecic’s clear, jargon-free prose and the texts she writes about also welcome readers in disciplines beyond literary studies and health humanities into the conversation.  

Illness as Narrative: 
https://upittpress.org/books/9780822961901/

Arlene Croce: 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1994/12/26/discussing-the-undiscussable

Arthur Frank:  
The Wounded Storyteller: Body, Illness, and Ethics, 2^nd ed. Univ of Chicago Press, 2013. (Orig. 1995) 

Illness as Narrative 
By Ann Jurecic 
University of Pittsbugh Press: 2012, 192 Pages 
Web Photo by Mostafa Saeed 

Junger’s memoir, In My Time of Dying, begins with a vivid account of that potentially fatal event. An aneurysm of a mid-sized artery in his pancreas had burst, causing unchecked internal bleeding. At the hospital, Junger slipped into hypotension, hypothermia, and semi-consciousness before surgical repair, which gave him a last minute surgical “save.”  

However, the main focus of Junger’s memoir is his experience of coming “face-to-face with an afterlife.” In the hospital, his dead father appeared to him. His father “exuded reassurance and seemed to be inviting me to go with him.” (p. 37) While this was happening, Junger recalls being awake and speaking to a doctor. Much that follows is a sustained reflection on the meaning of near-death experiences, drawing on the published literature, anecdotal accounts, as well as his own encounter with dying. 

He recounts the story of Tyler Carroll, a combat medic in Afghanistan, who was critically wounded and, as he was near death, “his whole life presented itself to him simultaneously and in great detail, as if twenty-one years of experience could exist outside linear time.” (p. 80) This so-called “life review,” is a common feature of such experiences, as well as encountering deceased loved ones, hovering outside the body, moving through a tunnel of light, and “being filled with love and bliss.” (p. 82) Junger is particularly impressed with the feelings of universal unity, often followed by a profound change in patients’ perspectives on the meaning of life. In the bibliography, he cites dozens of studies documenting the prevalence and characteristics of such phenomena.  

The author was initially skeptical, “Was I blessed by special knowledge or cursed by it?” (p. 93) He first considers the view of most neuroscientists that near-death experiences are hallucinations created by the dying brain, “The overwhelming likelihood is that our sense of another reality is just a comforting illusion that helps us live our lives.” (p. 118) He then considers the minority report, i.e. well-structured visions and thought processes, along with specific memories of external events (e.g. happenings in the room) raise a number of perplexing questions about the functioning of an oxygen-starved brain.  

We have absolutely no idea how the interior world of subjectivity arises from electrical impulses in the brain. Subjectivity exists, although nothing we know about the most basic components of the universe as we know it—quarks, electrons, waves, fields—permits it. Consequently, the belief that further research on the brain itself will yield a key to consciousness must be mistaken. Junger sums up the situation, “Our understanding of reality might be as limited as a dog’s understanding of television.” (p. 118)  

Junger points out that reality at the deepest level (i.e. the quantum world) is full of paradoxes and seeming impossibilities. It fails to answer many questions about the universe, in addition to the origin of mental phenomena. Consequently, he provisionally accepts the philosophical theory of panpsychism, i.e. “consciousness is woven into the very structure of matter” (p. 136) In other words, every component (e.g. quarks, fields) of the universe has a mental aspect, as well as a physical one. (I might interject here that panpsychism is not a prevalent theory among philosophers of mind, because they believe it raises more problems than it solves.) Given this framework, Sebastian Junger concludes that human consciousness might continue after death as part of a universal consciousness. From the text, I don’t think he believes this afterlife would necessarily retain a sense of individual identity.  

My Time of Dying is a thoughtful reflection on the meaning of life from a man who has experienced a close encounter with death. Junger has created a compelling narrative, making his memoir worth reading whether you believe near-death psychic phenomena point the way toward an afterlife, or think they are hallucinations generated by the dying brain.  

1. Van Lommel P, R. van Wees, V. Meyers, and I Elfferich. Near Death Survivors of Cardiac Arrest: A Prospective Study in the Netherlands. Lancet 358 (2001): 2039=2045 

2. Parnia S. and P. Fenwick. Near Death Experiences in Cardiac Arrest: Visions of a Dying Brain or Visions of a New Science. Resuscitation 52, no. 1 (2002): 5-11 

In My Time of Dying
Sebastian Junger
New York, Simon & Shuster, 2024, 162 pp.
http://www.sebastianjunger.com/in-my-time-of-dying 
Web photo byu Sebastien Gabriel