The book became, unwittingly it seems, the first of a trilogy ultimately concerned with what conscious is and does. The second book, This is Your Mind on Plants (2021), extends Pollan’s project to three mind-altering compounds found in plants: opium, caffeine, and mescaline, and the third, A World Appears (2026), is his attempt to discern consciousness itself. Here I cover Pollan’s investigation into consciousness across the three books, the results of which frustrated him and required a reconciliation.

The Trips Begin

In How to Change Your Mind, Pollan gives a brief summary of the bumpy history of psychedelics. He recounts how the intense and well-supported interest in them as therapeutic agents during the 1950s was almost completely snuffed out in the 1960s when “a moral panic about LSD engulfed America, and virtually all psychedelic research and therapy were either halted or driven underground” (p. 185). The panic reached its apogee when counterculture movements and their leaders, among them Timothy Leary of “turn on, tune in, drop out” fame, were seen as threats to mainstream society in general. The few remaining embers, though, reignited in the 1990s and by 2006 serious interest in psychedelics revived and research into clinical use resumed through legal means. Structures were in place allowing psychedelic use for specific purposes, opening the way for Pollan’s investigation.

Pollan arranged three separate “trips,” one each for the psychedelics LSD, psilocybin, and 5-MeO-DMT (i.e., “The Toad”). He carefully chose a tour guide for each one. He came through these sessions with what he interpreted as a dissolution of his ego, which made more room for his consciousness: “I was present to reality but as something other than my self” (p. 264). After these experiences and interviews with many scientists, psychologists, counselors, and users, Pollan constructed an argument about how the altered consciousness states psychedelics produce can offer benefits to individuals who are healthy or sick, and to societies that are stable or fractious, by sending “a life or culture down a new path” (p. 407). He is inspiring, vague, and fantastical at times; he gets more so in his follow-up book, Your Mind on Plants.

There’s No Place Like Home

Pollan expands his investigation of consciousness-altering substances by marrying it with his passion for plants and gardening. Therefore, he need not look further than his kitchen and garden for sources serving his interest at this stage: opium (poppy), caffeine (coffee and tea), and mescaline (San Pedro cacti). He explained his rationale for choosing these three mind-altering agents:

Taken together, these three plant drugs cover much of the spectrum of the human experience of psychoactive substances, from the everyday use of caffeine, the most popular psychoactive drug on the planet; to the ceremonial use of mescaline by Indigenous peoples; to the age-old use of opiates to relieve pain. (p. 4)

Pollan received guidance and supervision for his trials of opium and mescaline. As a self-described “heavy caffeine user,” he withdrew from it by giving up coffee and tea, thinking he could make inferences about caffeine effects through reverse engineering the experience.

While Pollan describes the effects these three agents had on his consciousness, he went further morphing from his role as an investigative journalist into roles of historian and anthropologist. Pollan covers how opium, caffeine, and mescaline altered the consciousness of millions of people through the millennia, and in doing so, says they figure in world history and human development, often in rather breathtaking terms. Opium spurred “the Romantic revolution in poetry” (p. 31). “Caffeine was the perfect drug not only for the age of reason and the Enlightenment but for the rise of capitalism, too” (p. 119). “The sins of slavery and imperialism, in a global system of production…could only have been fueled by caffeine” (p. 138).

While he does not credit mescaline with having contributed to human progress in such grand scales, Pollan speaks of its power in healing the most devastating wounds. But insofar as affecting consciousness, for him, mescaline does “what all psychedelics do—not so much change how we feel inside as imbue the world around us with never-before-appreciated qualities” (p. 217).

Pollan may have imbibed too much caffeine while writing this book judging from some of the conclusions he makes, but it may have fueled his subsequent quest to understand just what consciousness is rather than just what it does to his mind and its impact on world history. What he found on this quest, or more appropriately, what he didn’t find, became the basis for his next book, A World Appears.

Pollan Trips into a Cave

If psychedelics and mind-altering plants can change consciousness, then, as Pollan surmises in describing his objective with A World Appears, “consciousness is, at its core, a material phenomenon…[or there is] at least some credence to the idea” (p. xx). So off he goes on more trips, this time to experts working on finding a discernible form of consciousness, a trip that in the end fails, but still produces some value towards the way we think about artificial intelligence.

Pollan’s trips takes him to four ports of call, or “four different dimensions of consciousness” (p. xxxi). His first stop is “sentience,” which refers to consciousness as where in living beings sensations are perceived and responses to them generated. The next stop is “feelings,” the awareness of biological phenomena, the communication link between the body and the mind, serving homeostasis, for example. “Thought” is Pollan’s third stop, accounting for “the stream of thoughts that all of us experience every waking moment” (p. xxxii). His trip ends at “self,” or the ’I’ that takes in all of our experiences.

Each trip constitutes a chapter comprising what is known about consciousness from a particular dimension. Pollan describes and evaluates them with the help of people involved in their development. Across the four dimensions, he consults or references a wide range of experts including among others: neuroscientists, physicists, biologists, philosophers, psychologists, screenwriters, novelists, poets, and Buddhists. He combs through their theories, constructs, data, analogies, stories, and metaphors. Pollan, nevertheless, comes up empty, and is “abashed to say I know less now than I did when, naively, I set out to unravel the mystery of consciousness” (p. 225). It took several days in a cave at a Buddhist retreat high in the mountains of New Mexico for Pollan to reconcile with this outcome, “to let go into not-knowing.” He wound up accepting consciousness “as less a scientific or philosophical puzzle to be solved and more as a practice…Consciousness is a miracle, truly, and remains the deepest of mysteries” (p. 239).

So be it, but what then are we to make of the artificial intelligence industries’ determined attempts to integrate or discern consciousness in their machines? Pollan might say they will need a miracle.

Citations:
Pollan M. How to Change Your Mind. Penguin Books; 2019. 464 pages
Pollan M. This Is Your Mind on Plants. Penguin Press; 2021. 288 pages
Pollan M. A World Appears: A Journey into Consciousness. Penguin Press; 2026. 320 pages

Links:
My blog post elaborating on Pollan’s How to Change Your Mind is here, and on Your Mind on Plants is here.

Along with cohost, Dan Albrant, here’s a link to our podcast episode in which we focus on: consciousness, spirituality, and mysticism as what is at work in the effects psychedelics produce, and how they may delineate limits to biomedicine (rational or not), that is, how they brighten or blur the line between classic biomedicine and whatever isn’t. 

Edited by Lucy Bruell.
Web Image: Cave Man, Tim Brown, CC BY 3.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0>, via Wikimedia Commons

Shame is the capacity to suffer under the gaze of the other. The other can be anyone, even oneself; we’re perfectly able to feel wounded by our own perceptions. There’s also a certain pride in shame—as proof of moral rectitude, of earnestness, or of competence. A patient learns that he will eventually go blind; it takes a year for him to confess this news to his family. He feels ashamed, and at the same time, he feels proud to suffer in silence. Shared emotion brings relief to the afflicted, yet it propagates his suffering; and by what right do I pass on my pain to my loved ones?

I think about this on a park bench, with a bottle of pineapple juice on one hand and no intention of calling my family. Not wanting to propagate my suffering is an excuse; if I die, my family’s pain will be far greater.

It’s the loser’s shame, then. If I pass out, I lose. Who am I if I can’t keep my blood sugar under control? You shouldn’t have eaten that bowl of ramen. It’s your responsibility. There’s this dog lying on a patch of grass in front of me, and he’s still yawning, and I desperately want to pet it. I want to tend to a garden. I haven’t been able to get out of the city yet; I’d love to go for a hike, to lose myself on some trail, to be part of a nature-driven epiphany that makes me understand how the world works and calms me down and makes me accepting of my illness, turns me into a placid, kind-eyed monk.

But I’m sitting on this bench and I can’t feel my legs, I’m sweating and panting and I can barely see. How am I supposed to play cool independent adventurer in the woods? I hear there are bears. I picture a bear yawning, and I hoist my two-liter bottle of juice to take another swig.

An illness is also a healing balm, an unguent—especially if it is socially accepted. It serves as fertile ground; it mothers your identity; it bears fruit and takes root. One benefits immensely from one’s illness; indeed, some are so eager to have one that they craft their own. They build slowly, with care. They decorate. They perform. To be ill is to be a victim, and that notion proves delightfully relaxing. Guilt is drawn out of you and replaced by a certain calmness that feels as protective as it feels alienating.

My diabetes is my greatest, most beloved excuse. It never fails. My diabetes removes me from the equation, cancels me out. My diabetes drops me inside a limbo, a liminal space. Why do I call it mine? It punishes and rewards me. It’s my biggest bet against shame; whenever the dreaded feeling bubbles up, I can use my glucose levels to run and hide, to defend myself, to set up a smokescreen.

It’s part of the intricate fabric of my body-mind, perhaps even of my soul. Yet there was a time, nebulous and distant, when I was not diabetic. I barely remember it. Was that truly me back then? Have I been two different people? I’d feel naked without my glucose monitor and my insulin pump. Every shift within my mind, every movement of my body, every lighting up of every neuron affects my illness, and my illness, in turn, influences every cell that thinks and feels. I cannot exist separately from my hypoglycemia.

Even worse so: will I ever be able to exist without shame? Shame precedes even my autoimmunity; shame has always been there. If everything’s interconnected, then I’m forced to admit that shame played a defining role in the development of my illness. It’s also playing a role in my losing consciousness; it gives and takes away.

I drink and stare at the dog. I think I’d like him to be the last thing I see. It’s a good final image. But then… what if I’m exaggerating? Maybe this is nothing and I’m making a complete fool of myself for believing I’m about to drop dead and miss out on all the beauty of life—oh, the tragedy!—and maybe this yawning dog is just a dog and not my last impression of the world and the epitome of tender simplicity.

Those who are ashamed are very good at being victims, but they will also try their best to be caregivers. Helping another wounded soul proves I’m not quite so miserable myself. Service to others is a weapon I can wield; to fight against the meaninglessness of my existence and to show I have a right to be here. My diabetes grants me the people’s pity, and unlocks a new perspective, that of the chronically ill: a vantage point to which the majority have no access. Illness touches us all, just as life does; yet autoimmunity and degenerative ailments, inevitable and relentless, are not, fortunately, a shared experience for our species. This means that there are certain things, certain feelings or ways of coping, that only us, the permanently sick, can understand. Cold comfort, I know. But to carry the bodily wisdom of a chronic ailment, to feel it, deeply and daily, carving and scarring, should also make me capable of great empathy, of great compassion.

It does not. I’d be a wonderful caregiver if I wasn’t wholly corrupted by the urge, the desperate desire to exist solely within the gaze of others. The image in their minds is more powerful than the present moment in which I live, and stronger than the reality I could build for myself. Shame is the guiding factor in all this; it turns real people into members of an audience, and one cannot fail in front of an audience. One cannot show oneself, one needs to win approval. To really care for someone includes, necessarily, that you be vulnerable and open, genuine and honest. If what I want is for others to perceive me as a caregiver, then I’ll never actually become one.

Once again, the problem lies in my inability to step outside myself.

Web image by Riley Revell 

Narrative

Isles

José Luis Marín Aznárez 05.11.26

Illness, emotion, story, and the interconnectedness of it all; a meditation on a park bench, on the verge of death

John O’Connor, whom I happened to interview on May 5, explores a similar dynamic unfolding amid today’s psychedelic renaissance—a movement rife with magical thinking that he sees as something of a religious revival—in his delightful and enlightening new book A Short, Strange Trip: An Untold Story of Magic Mushrooms, Madness, and a Search for the Meaning of Life in the Amazon. 

Some Westerners are appropriating sacred plants while divorcing them from the traditions that gave them meaning—“colonizing them in reverse,” as American ethnobotanist Glenn Shepard puts it (p. 211). For example, ayahuasca use, despite widespread belief, may not date back thousands of years. Instead, O’Connor argues that the practice “rarely existed where Indians remained isolated from Western meddling” (p. 222). Its expansion beyond the Río Napo began relatively recently with Jesuit missions in the early 17th century and later accelerated through 19th-century rubber camps along the major river systems of the Amazon Basin. Through Western tourism, ayahuasca has come to be portrayed as “an ancient ritual for slaking our insatiable thirst for Indigenous salvation and/or for increasingly extravagant highs” (p. 223). 

During our meeting, O’Connor told me he does not “think there’s ultimately harm in appropriating a plant if you find it therapeutic, useful, or even life-saving—which a lot of people are reporting these drugs can be.” 

At the same time, he said, “we need to have an honest, good-faith conversation about where these drugs come from, what their actual Indigenous uses are, and what they are.” 

To write the book, which explores humanity’s broader relationship with psychedelics, from ancient religion to modern medicine, O’Connor worked with the Uitoto people to retrace an expedition undertaken some 50 years ago. Into the Colombian rainforest—home to begonias as red as blood and butterflies as wide as hubcaps—ventured scientific researcher Dennis McKenna and his older brother Terence, the visionary whose “tangled beard hung like an oriole’s nest past his chin” (p. xix). Weary of the war on drugs and fueled by utopian fantasies, Terence’s army of psychonauts sought a legendary hallucinogen that would turbocharge their DNA and “hasten a return to our preindustrial and preliterate past” (p. 284). 

In reality, Terence and his disciples did not transform into “eternal hyperdimensional beings” or travel via “flying saucers of the mind… ‘into the plenum of being’” (pp. 94, 30). Nor did they propel “human evolution forward to its next stage” by connecting to “the mind of nature itself” (pp. 284, 11). But they did experience auditory and visual hallucinations that led them, in a manner not unlike schizophrenia, “to adopt a new narrative interpretation of the world” (p. 95). 

Armed with the spore prints they’d brought back from La Chorrera, the McKenna brothers were “among the first, if not the very first, to successfully cultivate magic mushrooms at home, sparking a major leap forward in psychedelic history” (p. 202). In 1976, they published Psilocybin: Magic Mushroom Grower’s Guide; this April, half a century later, President Donald Trump signed an executive order expediting research into the therapeutic benefits of psilocybin and other substances of its ilk. 

O’Connor mentioned that one such mind-altering drug, ibogaine—made from the root of a Central African shrub—has shown promise in treating post-traumatic stress disorder and substance use disorders. 

“That’s great,” he told me, “but it also has a habit of slowing people’s heart rates considerably,” among other life-threatening side effects.  

“People are diving into these treatments as if there are no potential risks,” O’Connor, who teaches journalism at Boston College, added. “They don’t work for everyone—they’re not a magic bullet.” 

The remainder of the interview, which follows, has been edited for length and clarity.  

Why did you choose Terence as the focal point of the book? 

I hadn’t heard of him, and I pride myself on knowing about eccentric, overlooked weirdos from the psychedelic ’60s and ’70s. I was doing a lot of retail therapy online during the pandemic, as were many folks, and I came across his book, True Hallucinations (1989), totally by happenstance. I hadn’t known anything about it, bought it, and put it on the shelf for two years.  

I finally opened it one day and started reading. I had some preconceived ideas without really knowing anything about Terence or his subject. I thought it was probably some hippie-dippy thing about machine elves, and it sort of is that, but that’s not all it is. It’s a great narrative and just fascinating—it just captured me. 

Terence postulated that psilocybin mushrooms “played a crucial role in human evolution, giving our remote ancestors a jolt in language and cognition” and “turning Homo erectus into Homo sapiens.” While there’s nothing in the fossil record to support Terence’s “stoned ape theory,” according to anthropologist Laura Weyrich, advances in proteomics and DNA-sequencing technology could potentially indicate whether ancient hominids at least ate psychedelic mushrooms.  

How plausible do you think stoned ape theory is? 

When I first began looking into it, I was like, “Oh, this is so ridiculous.” I was embarrassed to ask these various paleoanthropologists, archaeologists, and researchers about it. I was like, “Oh my God, I can’t ask this, but I have to.” But it turns out that, as a thought experiment, many of them also found it interesting. It’s not something that I think is ultimately really provable. You could find some tangential scientific evidence, but you’re probably never going to get a smoking gun. 

Terence had a lot of theories—some relatively sane-seeming, like the stoned ape theory, and some completely batshit theories that have no basis in science or reason. But I sometimes liken him to Sigmund Freud, or maybe some of the kookier analytic philosophers, where you read it, it sounds kind of good, and then you get to the end and think, “Well, that’s probably 95 percent bullshit, but it still enriches my worldview.” I feel more enriched for having read it. That doesn’t mean it’s true, and I don’t put much credence in it, but it’s fun to entertain, and I do think it enriches the way I think about the human mind and human possibility. 

You also mention how “what drove [you] to write this book was in part a procession of deaths and their aftermaths” you and your wife endured starting in 2019. Would you elaborate on that? 

About a year into writing the book, my son, who was four at the time, fell ill unexpectedly, out of nowhere. He was in and out of the hospital during those days. It really brought us face to face, for the first time as parents, with real suffering and grief, and with being totally out of control when it came to finding a remedy for him. There was just no help to be found anywhere. I started thinking about grief and suffering, and how much of it was around us.  

Then there was this kind of cascade of deaths—just a lot coming at once over the span of a couple of years. It made me wonder what psychedelics, at least on a therapeutic level, potentially have to offer people: some relief.  

Another thing: My father was, weirdly, at the same time, starting to consider psychedelic-assisted therapy to treat his depression and longstanding addiction to alcohol. Maybe a year before, I’d given him Michael Pollan’s book, How to Change Your Mind: What the New Science Teaches Us About Consciousness, Dying, Addiction, Depression, and Transcendence (2018). Because my dad had been in and out of therapy, rehab, and 12-step programs for many years, I was like, “I don’t know if you’ve heard of this, but I’ve been reading about non-traditional approaches to treating alcohol addiction, including psychedelics.” I don’t think he ever read it, but it did start a conversation between us. 

What surprised you most while researching the book? 

Reading Terence, I hadn’t realized that psilocybin mushrooms were not indigenous to La Chorrera—that they were essentially a foreign import [1], and not something used by the people there, certainly not by shamans. 

Another revelation was what “shamanism” actually looks like in the Colombian Putumayo. Terence talked a lot about this sort of psychedelic shamanism. A lot of people do today, too. But it’s just not at all what it seems to be. The Indigenous perspective on and use of things like ayahuasca, or yagé, and other psychedelic plants—at least in the Putumayo, where Terence and Dennis spent much of their time—is vastly different from how I think they’re generally understood or used in the U.S. These substances were generally not used for healing. Until European contact with Indigenous peoples throughout the Amazon Basin, ayahuasca was mostly used in the hunt—to have luck in finding animals—or sometimes to find lost objects or communicate with family members or other tribe members over long distances. But it was definitely not a therapeutic application. That’s starting to shift a little bit now, though, because of this strange sort of cross-pollination that happens so often in history where it’s now being fed back into an Indigenous context. 

I think I went into the book as something of a Terence fanboy. I cooled on him a bit once I spoke with Colombian anthropologists and ethnobotanists and realized how taken out of context many of his proclamations were on psychedelics and the “shamanic” experience. But, by the end, I sort of warmed to him again because I realized that his ultimate project, I think, was really about human wellness and flourishing. I think that’s what he wanted ultimately, even if he went about it in a strange, myopic way focused almost exclusively on the psychedelic experience through psilocybin mushrooms. That’s where I part ways with him. I think the best place from which to grapple with grief, loss, and suffering is through love, tenderness, and compassion—not through machine elves at the end of history, which was, more or less, Terence’s take. 

I was also interested in your discussion of “diagonalism”—what scholars William Callison and Quinn Slobodian characterize as the social-distress-born alliances between the far left and the far right uniting wellness gurus, anti-vaxxers, and conspiracy theorists. 

I was just reading an article by the American political scientist Francis Fukuyama; he calls it this horseshoe meeting of the minds—this ideological vortex where people with otherwise totally divergent political opinions are meeting in the middle on certain issues. The far left, the Make America Healthy Again movement, the Multidisciplinary Association for Psychedelic Studies—even just the friendship between [MAPS founder] Rick Doblin and former Texas Governor Rick Perry [co-founder of the nonprofit Americans for Ibogaine], who had one of the most conservative legislative agendas in recent memory. That friendship seems genuine—and maybe even necessary to advance these drugs beyond their current legal status. 

In 2023, MAPS hosted the world’s largest psychedelic conference, which you describe as laden with snake oil pseudoscience and lacking in diversity, equity, and inclusion. Almost a year later, an FDA advisory panel rejected MDMA-assisted therapy for PTSD, citing safety concerns and questions about data validity. Critics alleged that MAPS’ drug development arm failed to disclose data showing sexual misconduct by therapists and increased suicidality among trial participants. A former MAPS volunteer called MAPS an exploitative and abusive cult that functions “more like a religious movement than a scientific organization.” Similar concerns emerged at The Johns Hopkins Center for Psychedelic and Consciousness Research. An ethics complaint accused founding director Roland Griffiths of “acting as a ‘spiritual leader’ rather than a scientist” and influencing participant outcomes through religious symbolism. 

Additionally, a Columbia psychiatrist reviewing the field noted a relatively high rate of  irritability, anxiety, insomnia, and other adverse events, and called for more “rigorous assessment” of psilocybin-assisted therapy.  

How do we balance the potential of psychedelics to promote empathy and well-being with the risks? 

Terence said a lot of completely bullshit things about psychedelics—even dangerous things at times. You see that in the movement today, where a lot of these wild, unsubstantiated claims are being made about drugs that, yes, have real healing potential for many people, but for others, such as my father, don’t work at all—and arguably cause more harm than good. 

We should be sane and sober about this. We can champion these drugs while still having a lucid conversation about their efficacy, limitations, and safety concerns. 

[1] One of my favorite passages from the book is “Darkly gilled, with distinctive golden halos and pink veils around slender stems the color of bruised flesh, they were easily identifiable as Psilocybe cubensis… Likely brought to the Americas by Spanish missionaries via the dung of zebu cattle—rangy saltwhite beasts with enormous, scythe-like horns—Psilocybe did especially well in the humid pastures of La Chorrera. Amazonian shamans, who knew more about psychoactive plants than anyone on earth, had no use for these foreign imports. To Terence, however, they were living manifestations of the divine” (p. xx). 

A Short, Strange Trip: An Untold Story of Magic Mushrooms, Madness, and a Search for the Meaning of Life in the Amazon 
John O’Connor 
New York: Sourcebooks 
2026 

Hypoglycemia can kill you fast. The brain, our most self-centered organ, is also the greatest consumer of glucose. If blood sugar levels drop, it starts to shut down the rest of the body, in a desperate attempt to save fuel —it will drink every last drop of sweet sustenance before collapsing.

That’s how it feels; like parts of me slowly go dark. If I collapse, right here, in the middle of this park, I won’t have had a chance to say goodbye.

It’s a beautiful day outside. Beneath the trees, the filtered light takes on a greenish hue. A dog yawns on a patch of grass in front of me. I’ve found a spot on the corner of a bench facing a fountain—I can barely see it though, given the sheer number of people coming and going, dodging one another and getting in the way. I rub my right hand against my thigh, starting from the knee, pressing down with my thumb. I look around and crane my neck, trying to scrunch it down over my shoulders like an accordion.

I need to drink this entire bottle of pineapple juice. I bought it at a street stall the moment my alarm went off. Something must have gone wrong—with my meal, with the heat, with my nerves, or with who knows what, but my blood sugar is draining away, slipping right out of my body. Within the nebula that is my mind, clusters of stars begin to vanish. Suddenly, in a corner, the light goes out. A void emerges in the upper-left quadrant; I lose an immense cloud of hydrogen, and, along with it, all sensation in my feet. Blinking becomes a conscious task that demands effort; I don’t want to make it, so I simply close my eyes as I drink. There dies a sun, leaving its entire solar system in complete darkness. My hand has already made a hundred trips up and down my thigh. It occurs to me that all this back-and-forth motion is burning glucose, but the movement helps keep my anxiety at bay. Fighting this panic is costing me the very sugar I don’t have; I am living proof (at least for now) that sometimes, resisting the inevitable only makes things worse. If you fall into quicksand, stay still.

Someone shouts, somebody laughs and claps; there’s people making music, but it’s all distorted, as if the hot air were making the sounds bubble. I hear the beep of my insulin pump. It hasn’t stopped vibrating; I pull it out from my pocket and imagine it’s screaming at me, threatening me. My sugar levels are very low, and they’re still plummeting. The app on my phone—connected to the glucose monitoring patch on my arm—picks it up, too: my screen turns crimson, filled with arrows pointing straight down. I don’t have much time.

At least I’m sitting down, though I doubt I could stand. I think about calling an ambulance, but I suspect that if I had to start speaking to explain the situation, my voice would sound like a soaking-wet mop dragging across a school hallway floor. Besides, wouldn’t it be better to call my mother? Or my father, or my siblings—or the girl I dated a couple of years ago? Because I’ve only ever managed to fall in love once, with her; what a waste it would be if I died here, alone in a park bench. I’d lose the chance to experience that feeling again.

I should tell my mother that I love her, but there’s a six-hour time difference between New York and Madrid, so she’ll be asleep; and honestly, I don’t think I have the time or energy left to unlock my phone and make the call. I ought to keep drinking. The more pineapple juice I gulp down, the higher my chances of survival. I’ve never really known exactly when a person loses consciousness and slips into a coma—I don’t know how close I am to that edge. I don’t know how far away those thresholds lie, or how quickly they’re being crossed. I want to call someone, or cry out for help, or at least make sure that someone sees me losing consciousness—if only so I can say that someone was there, that someone witnessed it. That they saw the sun go out.

I don’t do it. I move only my arm; I bring the juice to my lips. My fingers tingle. I tremble.
A blink of an eye lasts longer than before.

I stare at a shapeless, unfocused mass of people. There’s this phase in hypoglycemia in which I feel myself reverting to something animalistic, primitive, a beast between two palm fronds; I’m in awe of the certainty I feel that nothing matters except my own survival.

An example: I drag my body to the fridge, haul myself forward, shove everything into my mouth without thinking; juice and Coca-Cola drip down my chin; I mix bread and fruit and cheese and sauces and whatever else I find; I use my hands—tearing, shredding, and stuffing it all into my mouth—barely chewing, coughing and spitting, then swallowing again; my fingers slick with grease. A ravenous urge burns across my forehead, and I breathe with incredible depth, as if someone were pumping oxygen into me through a funnel embedded in my throat.

I remember having done that several times.

I exhale, emptying myself out, and sparks fly from between my teeth. I can’t see clearly. Things—people? —move before me, but they’re terribly blurred. It doesn’t matter; I’m the center of the universe. I’m like a child. I drink my juice.

The feeling of losing control is a curious one, for it seems to be well-organized. From the bottom up, my limbs go numb. Mental fog seeps in through my nose and settles in my glabella. It concentrates; crystallizes. My thoughts cease to be mine—though I wonder if they ever truly were—and questions of this sort—like the one about love—begin to bubble up. Flashes.

Suddenly, I find myself wondering if I have ever truly been rebellious. I don’t know. My mother used to say that as a baby, I never cried—that I was pure tenderness. The thought of dying fills me with distress, for tenderness makes everything interesting, and I long to hold a little girl in my arms—to know that she’s my daughter, to watch her cling to me, burying her fingernails into my skin, like tiny half grains of rice. I tell myself that this is my life’s dream and purpose; for a moment, it feels as though my body might finally be able to relax—but it doesn’t. There remains a starry corner of my mind that still clings to the juice, to the park, to the yawning dog, and to reality itself. I take another sip.

A sudden flash: a line from a John Ashbery poem that says the bedroom of the soul is our moment of attention. I force myself to pay it— I tell me that, in doing so, I’m bringing myself back to consciousness. A minute’s passed? Or is it already the next day? I can’t tell.

Tachycardia is the worst part, for it forces itself upon me. It tramples my chest, imposing a rhythm of time from which there’s no escape. The only thing I can feel is my heart.

A hundred beats.
Hundred and twenty.
Hundred and forty.

Panic and tachycardia are close allies —and panic is a diabetic’s sworn enemy. It wants to trick me, it whispers, tells me everyone’s watching me, says all can hear the frantic hammering in my chest. Random clusters of thought dissolve, giving way to a single, definitive question. It is here that my illness bifurcates, and I ask myself (as I’ve been doing for years): which comes first, diabetes or shame?

I don’t dial 911, I don’t call my family, and I don’t ask for help, because I am ashamed. Right now, on the verge of losing consciousness, nothing should matter except staying alive. I ought to scream, to make a scene; for if I simply let myself fade away while sitting on a bench in the middle of Washington Square Park, no one is going to stop and help me. New Yorkers are more than used to seeing people sprawled on the ground, asleep on benches, or passed out in the subway; they won’t be the least bit fazed to stumble upon a twenty-something year old with his head lolling and his eyes closed, sitting upright, back straight, clothes clean, beard neatly trimmed. I need to grab their attention—my life’s slipping away, my blood feels as if it’s being pulled downward—I have to do something, right here, right now, but I can’t.

Asking for help means intruding on another person; it means meeting their gaze, making demands, stepping out into the spotlight to take a bow before the entire audience. It is here, in this theater of interaction, where human beings are made and molded. In my case, the guiding emotion is shame. The gaze of the other is the place where we all live and die. What is it, then? What’s about to kill me? Hypoglycemia, or my own inability to step outside myself?

Web image from Wiki Commons.

Although Stevenson’s fieldwork was unusually thorough, mainstream scientists rejected reincarnation as a viable explanation and instead focused on potential methodological weaknesses such as retrospective testimony, cultural influence, and the difficulty of ruling out information leakage. Stevenson described the cases as “suggestive,” but he made clear that reincarnation—or at least the survival and transfer of some aspect of personality—was, in his view, the most plausible interpretation.

The twenty cases in the 1966 volume represented only a fraction of the material Stevenson had been collecting since 1960. His early publications had attracted the attention of Chester Carlson, the inventor of the Xerox process, who left a bequest of one million dollars to the University of Virginia upon his death in 1968. The Department of Psychiatry used the gift to establish the Division of Perceptual Studies (DOPS), with Stevenson as its founding director. The name provided an academically respectable umbrella for research that included, but did not explicitly advertise, the study of children’s past-life memories.

Over the next three and a half decades, Stevenson and his colleagues expanded their investigations across Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and the Americas. By the time of his death in 2007, Stevenson had published twelve additional books and more than three hundred papers, documenting over 2,000 cases. In 1999, journalist Tom Shroder’s detailed investigation, Old Souls. The Scientific Evidence for Past Lives offered an intimate portrait of Stevenson’s fieldwork and helped bring the research to wider public attention.²

Leadership of the program passed to child psychiatrist Jim Tucker in 2002, when Stevenson retired.³ Tucker became Director of DOPS in 2014 and, in 2021, published Before, an updated synthesis of his own two earlier books. ⁴ Tucker reports that the DOPS database now includes more than 2,500 cases worldwide, including many from North America. Only a minority—roughly 15–25 percent—qualify as “strong cases,” meaning that the child’s statements were independently verified as matching a specific deceased individual.

The strongest cases share several converging features: verified statements about the previous life, verified identification of the deceased individual, physical correspondences such as birthmarks or birth defects, behavioral continuities, and early onset of statements. One of Stevenson’s most striking findings involved physical correspondences. By 1997, he had documented 210 cases in which a child had a birthmark or birth defect corresponding to a wound on the deceased individual, and in 49 of these, he obtained autopsy reports confirming the precise wound locations.⁵ These findings were presented in detail in Where Reincarnation and Biology Intersect and in his massive two-volume monograph Reincarnation and Biology.⁶

Here is an example of one of Ian Stevenson’s earlier strong cases. When Swarnlata Mishra was three years old, she began singing unfamiliar songs and performing dance steps her family had never seen, dances from a region of India more than a hundred miles from the family’s home. Soon she was describing a former life as a woman named Biya Pathak, recalling the layout of Biya’s house, the names of her children, and even a stash of money hidden in a wall. Stevenson documented her statements before any contact with the Pathak family, and when they eventually visited, Swarnlata greeted them with an ease and specificity that startled everyone present. She correctly identified family members, teased one man with a childhood nickname only Biya had used, and pointed out a brother’s limp. The encounter had the uncanny feel of a reunion rather than an interview, and for Stevenson it became one of the clearest examples of a case where detailed memories, personality traits, and verifiable facts converged before any possibility of normal information transfer.

More than half a century later, Jim Tucker encountered a very similar pattern in the case of “Ryan,” a young boy from the American Midwest. At age four, Ryan began speaking urgently about a previous life in Hollywood—describing movie sets, agents, and a bustling life in Los Angeles. His parents, who had no interest in reincarnation, tried to reassure him, but the boy’s distress grew until Tucker became involved. Using Ryan’s spontaneous statements, Tucker and the family identified a long-forgotten bit-part actor and Hollywood extra from the 1930s and 40s. Ryan had given more than fifty details about this man’s life, including the street he lived on, the name of a restaurant he frequented, and the fact that he had danced on Broadway before moving west. Many of these details were later verified in archives and autobiographical sources unavailable to the family. What made the case especially compelling to Tucker was not only the accuracy of the statements but the emotional tone: Ryan spoke of the former life with longing and confusion, as if caught between two identities, until the memories gradually faded around age six.

Here is an example of a case in which the child had birthmarks corresponding to the deceased person’s wounds. In rural Burma, a young boy began speaking at age three about having been a man who was shot from behind while walking along a road. His parents were startled not only by the specificity of his statements but by his two unusual birthmarks: a small, round mark on his chest and a larger, irregular one on his back. When Stevenson later investigated, he found that the boy’s descriptions matched the death of a man from a nearby village who had been killed by a close-range gunshot. Eyewitness accounts and medical documentation confirmed the wound pattern, which corresponded closely to the boy’s birthmarks. The child also showed a deep, visceral fear of guns and loud noises, reacting with panic in ways that seemed disproportionate to anything in his current environment. The case combined early and detailed verbal statements, independently verifiable information about a violent death, and physical marks on the child’s body that mirrored the trauma he described.

Stevenson’s long-term research program—and Tucker’s continuation of it—poses a direct challenge to the assumption that consciousness is wholly generated by the brain. Across more than 2,500 investigated cases, they documented young children who spontaneously described memories, behaviors, and emotional dispositions corresponding to identifiable deceased individuals. While most cases are incomplete or ambiguous, a substantial minority meet stringent evidential criteria, and more than two hundred combine multiple independent lines of evidence: verified statements, behavioral continuities, and physical correspondences. Critics have proposed cultural contamination, suggestion, fraud, or loose investigative methods, but none of these explanations plausibly account for the best-documented cases, especially those with medical records, multiple independent witnesses, and physical anomalies. Even the most skeptical reviewers have struggled to articulate a coherent alternative hypothesis that explains the full pattern of data.⁷

For more than sixty years, however, mainstream scientists have dismissed the research. Critics argue that the stories of past lives are most likely due to coincidence, misinterpretation, parental influence, observer bias, or other sources of error. They emphasize the complexities of contextualizing and translating these “memories,” especially in cultures with strong beliefs in reincarnation.⁷ Yet critics rarely engage with the case narratives themselves; instead, they rely on hypothetical sources of error. To attribute all of these cases solely to flawed methodology would require assuming that Stevenson, Tucker, and DOPS have repeatedly committed the same errors for six decades despite their detailed rebuttals of such claims.

The deeper criticism, however, is philosophical. Although surveys show that most Americans and physicians believe in a soul or spirit, most philosophers and neuroscientists endorse a materialist-reductionist view: the brain creates the mind through electrochemical activity, and consciousness ends with the death of the body. Clinically, there is ample evidence that consciousness depends on a functioning brain—brain injuries and diseases clearly alter mental states, and imaging techniques reveal neural pathways associated with various emotions and thoughts. For clinical purposes, consciousness appears entirely dependent on the physical brain.

Yet this dependence does not settle the metaphysical question of what consciousness is. Critics of Stevenson and Tucker often assume, without argument, that the physical world as described by contemporary physics is the totality of what exists, and that consciousness must therefore be a byproduct of physical interactions. But subjective experience—the interior world of personal identity—does not obviously follow from any known property of quarks, electrons, photons, neutrinos, or the forces that govern them. The gap between third-person description and first-person experience is conceptually radical. No arrangement of particles, however complex, seems to entail subjectivity, i.e. interior life, in the way that arrangements of particles entail objects, organisms, or chemical bonding. To assume that this gap will close through further study of neural circuitry is to smuggle in a metaphysical conclusion under the guise of scientific optimism.

The quantum world is exceptionally weird – in many ways it violates common sense. Particles are also waves and waves are particles. An electron can be in multiple places at once. The behavior of one particle may determine the behavior of another, even though they are too far apart for a message to pass between them. Particles can tunnel through barriers apparently without having enough energy to do so. However, none of this weirdness suggests that large accumulations of particles (e.g. atoms, molecules, brains) could generate an interior world of personal identity There must be a deeper, more complete, theory of what exists in the universe that does account for the generation of consciousness; a quantum of subjectivity, if you will. As science writer Jim Holt summarized in Why Does the World Exist?, “The properties of a complex system like the brain don’t just pop into existence from nowhere; they must derive from the properties of the system’s ultimate constituents. Those ultimate constituents must therefore have subjective features themselves.”⁸

This is why the possibility that consciousness has a fundamental place in the universe is not mystical speculation but a legitimate philosophical alternative. Some philosophers and neuroscientists propose that consciousness may be an intrinsic aspect of matter, or that the universe contains a fundamental “interior” dimension alongside its measurable exterior. Panpsychism—the view that consciousness is woven into the structure of matter—is endorsed by a small, but growing, minority of philosophers, including David Chalmers⁹, Philip Goff¹⁰, and Galen Strawson.¹¹ Another group, notably Thomas Nagel¹² and John Searle¹³, acknowledge that our current physical ontology is incomplete, although not fully endorsing panpsychism. Physics has repeatedly revised its understanding of matter; it is not unreasonable to suspect that consciousness may require a similarly deep revision. To quote Thomas Nagel, “Consciousness is the most conspicuous obstacle to a comprehensive naturalism that relies only on the resources of physical science. The existence of consciousness seems to imply that the physical description of the universe, despite its richness and explanatory power, is only part of the truth.”¹²

Given these considerations, the continuation of consciousness, at least in some form, after death seems at least a possibility. Stevenson and Tucker’s work may well represent the identification of a previously unknown natural phenomenon, perhaps analogous to reported near-death experiences — well-documented yet difficult to explain. To my mind, this conclusion is more likely than is six decades of repeated errors.

However, that doesn’t mean the “former lives” data necessarily support a traditional doctrine of reincarnation, in which a unitary soul passes from one body to another. If a psychic dimension of the cosmos exists, a one-to-one transmission of “mind-stuff” to a newborn baby in the same country and culture seems overly simplistic, more in line with supernatural beliefs than with an unknown natural phenomenon. It is notable that the phenomenon is rare and the memories transient and strongly associated with traumatic death. Could it be that, under certain conditions, a “package” of psychic impressions may transfer from a dying person to a newborn, occasionally even influencing the child’s body? This, like any other scenario, is speculative, given our ignorance of the origin and meaning of consciousness in the physical world.

The broader point is that most philosophers and neuroscientists begin with an unexamined premise: that everything real must be physical in the sense described by current physics. But consciousness—the one phenomenon we know from the inside—does not obviously fit within that framework. Before declaring that mind must be reducible to matter, we should ensure that our conception of matter is adequate to account for mind at all. Consequently, Stevenson’s and Tucker’s six-decade quest to understand the experience of children who report having lived former lives should, if anything, leave us wondering whether we really know what we think we know about the way the universe works.

References 

1. Stevenson, Ian Twenty Cases Suggestive of Reincarnation, University of Virginia Press, 1980 [First published in 1966] 
2. Schroder, Tom. Old Souls. The Scientific Evidence for Past Lives. New York, Simon & Schuster, 1999 
3. Tucker, Jim B. Ian Stevenson and Cases of the Reincarnation Type, Journal of Scientific Exploration. 2008; 22: 36-43 
4. Tucker, Jim. B. Before: Children’s Memories of Previous Lives, St. Martin’s Press, 2021 
5. Stevenson, Ian. Where Reincarnation and Biology Intersect. Westport. Praeger, 1997 
6. Stevenson, Ian. Reincarnation and Biology: A Contribution to the Etiology of Birthmarks and Birth Defects, Westport, Praeger, 1997 [Two volumes] 
7. Matlock, J. G. ‘Reincarnation Case Studies: Criticisms’. Psi Encyclopedia. London: The Society for Psychical Research. <https://psi-encyclopedia.spr.ac.uk/articles/criticisms-reincarnation-case-studies/>. (2022, retrieved 24 March 2026) 
8. Holt, Jim. Why Does the World Exist? London, W. W. Norton & Company, 2012, p. 194 
9. Chalmers, David J. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford University Press, 1997 
10. Goff, Philip. Galileo’s Error. Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness. New York, Pantheon Books, 2019 
11. Strawson, Galen. Consciousness and Its Place in Nature, Imprint Academic, 2024 
12. Nagel, Thomas. Mind & Cosmos. New York, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 35 
13. Searle, John. Mind: A Brief Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2005 

Web image by Medhum.org

Literature mirrors the general culture. There has been a recent explosion of books in which AI is the central plot device moving the narrative forward to endings that range from a utopian fulfillment of human destiny to the catastrophic collapse of civilization and the annihilation of humankind. But AI infiltrated the literary space several decades ago. Philip Dick imagined a world in Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? where cyborgs were being hunted down because of fear that they might take over the world. In 2001: A Space Odyssey by Arthur C. Clarke, a robot named Hal murders nearly all the crew of a spaceship on a planetary mission because of a programming error. 

Speak by Louisa Hall is more recent addition to the AI library. But it was published several years before large language models became a routine tool to plan a vacation or write a letter of recommendation. Is it still worth reading in 2025? 

The novel is a composite narrative centered around five interwoven stories spanning the time period from 1663 to 2040. In the first narrative, a young Puritan girl who finds herself in an unwanted marriage, records her thoughts in a diary that she is writing on a treacherous ocean voyage to America. Fast forward to the 20^th century and we meet Alan Turing who is writing letters to the mother of young man to whom he was emotionally attached and who died prematurely. He is troubled by his inability at times to communicate with people. A decade later we meet Karl and Ruth Dettman, a couple whose families escaped Nazi Germany but under vastly different circumstances. The husband, Karl, is a computer scientist who has developed a program named MARY to enable computers to interact with humans. Ruth, his wife, is a historian who has built a career centered on the publication of old diaries like the one written by the young woman traveling to America. She is trying to convince Karl to expand the memory of his computer program and enrich it with more human material, but Karl stubbornly refuses because he is concerned about the power of his program to overwhelm its users if its database is expanded. Finally, we jump ahead to 2040, and we read the transcripts of the trial of Stephen Chinn, a man who is being prosecuted for the production of robots that are too life-like. Chinn is being accused of causing physical and psychological harm to the people who have used his robots and of weakening normal relationships between people. A young adolescent named Gaby, who was given a doll powered by a version of MARY, is one of his alleged victims. His own personal recollections are folded into the trial proceedings, as he tries to describe his intentions, justify his actions, and make amends for where they may have gone awry. 

Taking stock of our world today, there is clear evidence that AI can improve the day-to-day lot of people, make life more convenient and efficient, and promote better health outcomes. However, much of the current angst that permeates discussions of AI is focused on the potential economic and sociopolitical consequences. There is fear that systematic adoption of AI will lead to widespread loss of jobs and financial distress for people left behind. The generation of false data and uncontrolled dissemination of unfiltered information may, it is feared, foster social unrest and destabilize democratic institutions.  

All of these predictions, for good or for bad, center on the word “intelligence.” If it is defined as the creative use of information towards a specific goal– my definition, to be sure — then it exists along a gradient and there is not an opposing term. In that case, the mixed picture about the future of AI seems accurate. Humans can process information to both noble and destructive ends. If machines are provided information by humans, then it is likely that there will be worthy and flawed outcomes. It is not a reflection of the logical structures or neural networks that are built into us as humans or artificially placed into machines. It simply is the nature of intelligence. Information is agnostic and it can be processed in a limitless number of ways; there is no guarantee of what will happen when it is processed. 

On the other hand, if we center our predictions on the word “artificial,” there is an opposing term, namely “genuine.” Speak looks beyond AI as intelligence and forces us to think about its impact on interpersonal communication and interactions. The design of the robots that are being created in fiction and in our world of 2025 is steadily improving. The voices become more lifelike, the reactions more emotionally appropriate, the reactions more convincing. They display keen intelligence and manifest seeming empathy with their handlers. Like the artificial friend in Klara and the Sun by Kazuo Ishigura, the robots may even appear to have more feelings and awareness of the ever-changing psychological state of their owners than family members and friends. But it will always remain artificial. Speak forces us to ponder whether interactions between human beings have an element that cannot be programmed, that is not simply manipulation of information. It is that piece that accounts for the genuine nature of relationships between people and it is that component that is vital for human growth and maturation. The interconnected stories in Speak raise the concern that reliance on AI, in whatever embodied form it takes, to provide support and companionship may inevitably fail and leave damaged humans in its mechanical wake. The intelligence of AI may not be sufficient for humans to thrive. It remains difficult to put into words exactly what to call this additional component of human interaction. Thankfully, there is literature, and creative novels like Speak, to help us grapple with what it might be and to help us steer a course where AI is developed thoughtfully with full awareness of its limitations and potential for good and harm. 

SPEAK  
Louisa Hall 
EccoPress, New York 2016, 356 pp 
Web image by Medhum.org

Junger’s memoir, In My Time of Dying, begins with a vivid account of that potentially fatal event. An aneurysm of a mid-sized artery in his pancreas had burst, causing unchecked internal bleeding. At the hospital, Junger slipped into hypotension, hypothermia, and semi-consciousness before surgical repair, which gave him a last minute surgical “save.”  

However, the main focus of Junger’s memoir is his experience of coming “face-to-face with an afterlife.” In the hospital, his dead father appeared to him. His father “exuded reassurance and seemed to be inviting me to go with him.” (p. 37) While this was happening, Junger recalls being awake and speaking to a doctor. Much that follows is a sustained reflection on the meaning of near-death experiences, drawing on the published literature, anecdotal accounts, as well as his own encounter with dying. 

He recounts the story of Tyler Carroll, a combat medic in Afghanistan, who was critically wounded and, as he was near death, “his whole life presented itself to him simultaneously and in great detail, as if twenty-one years of experience could exist outside linear time.” (p. 80) This so-called “life review,” is a common feature of such experiences, as well as encountering deceased loved ones, hovering outside the body, moving through a tunnel of light, and “being filled with love and bliss.” (p. 82) Junger is particularly impressed with the feelings of universal unity, often followed by a profound change in patients’ perspectives on the meaning of life. In the bibliography, he cites dozens of studies documenting the prevalence and characteristics of such phenomena.  

The author was initially skeptical, “Was I blessed by special knowledge or cursed by it?” (p. 93) He first considers the view of most neuroscientists that near-death experiences are hallucinations created by the dying brain, “The overwhelming likelihood is that our sense of another reality is just a comforting illusion that helps us live our lives.” (p. 118) He then considers the minority report, i.e. well-structured visions and thought processes, along with specific memories of external events (e.g. happenings in the room) raise a number of perplexing questions about the functioning of an oxygen-starved brain.  

We have absolutely no idea how the interior world of subjectivity arises from electrical impulses in the brain. Subjectivity exists, although nothing we know about the most basic components of the universe as we know it—quarks, electrons, waves, fields—permits it. Consequently, the belief that further research on the brain itself will yield a key to consciousness must be mistaken. Junger sums up the situation, “Our understanding of reality might be as limited as a dog’s understanding of television.” (p. 118)  

Junger points out that reality at the deepest level (i.e. the quantum world) is full of paradoxes and seeming impossibilities. It fails to answer many questions about the universe, in addition to the origin of mental phenomena. Consequently, he provisionally accepts the philosophical theory of panpsychism, i.e. “consciousness is woven into the very structure of matter” (p. 136) In other words, every component (e.g. quarks, fields) of the universe has a mental aspect, as well as a physical one. (I might interject here that panpsychism is not a prevalent theory among philosophers of mind, because they believe it raises more problems than it solves.) Given this framework, Sebastian Junger concludes that human consciousness might continue after death as part of a universal consciousness. From the text, I don’t think he believes this afterlife would necessarily retain a sense of individual identity.  

My Time of Dying is a thoughtful reflection on the meaning of life from a man who has experienced a close encounter with death. Junger has created a compelling narrative, making his memoir worth reading whether you believe near-death psychic phenomena point the way toward an afterlife, or think they are hallucinations generated by the dying brain.  

1. Van Lommel P, R. van Wees, V. Meyers, and I Elfferich. Near Death Survivors of Cardiac Arrest: A Prospective Study in the Netherlands. Lancet 358 (2001): 2039=2045 

2. Parnia S. and P. Fenwick. Near Death Experiences in Cardiac Arrest: Visions of a Dying Brain or Visions of a New Science. Resuscitation 52, no. 1 (2002): 5-11 

In My Time of Dying
Sebastian Junger
New York, Simon & Shuster, 2024, 162 pp.
http://www.sebastianjunger.com/in-my-time-of-dying 
Web photo byu Sebastien Gabriel